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THE CLASSIFICATION OF
CRIMES IN WISCONSIN
PAUL P.

LIPTON*

This study is prompted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's recent
holding that a violation of the Wisconsin income tax law constitutes
a misdemeanor rather than a felony.1 In a case of first impression, the
court held that income tax offenses were not upgraded to felonies
merely because they became punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison by the enactment of the "place of imprisonment" statute2 in
1945. The decision has important implications with respect to the grade
of other criminal offenses, particularly crimes not contained in the
3
Criminal Code.
WISCONSIN STATUTES

Section 939.60 of the Wisconsin statutes provides that "a crime
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison is a felony" and that
"every other crime is a misdemeanor."' 4 Though the precise wording
*Attorney (Wisconsin; Massachusetts) ; formerly, Special Attorney and Trial
Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service.
1 State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis.2d 609, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966), rehearing denied September 12, 1966. This article is based mostly upon research
undertaken by the author as counsel for the taxpayer in the Gaynon case.
The views expressed herein undoubtedly reflect the results of such advocacy.
2

WIs. STAT.

§959.044 (1965).

3 WIs. STAT. chs. 939-947 (1965).
4

The present definition was enacted by Wis. Laws 1949, ch. 631, §27. Previously,
the statute read: "Any offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
is a felony." WIs. STAT. §353.31 (1945), as created by Wis. Laws 1945, ch. 241.
From 1849 to 1945, the statutes provided that "the term 'felony', when
used in any statute, shall be construed to mean an offense for which the
offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law to be punished by imprisonment
in a state prison." Wis. STAT. §353.31 (1943) ; Revised Statutes, 1849, ch.

141, §14.
Under this definition the Attorney General had ruled that a crime not
expressly designated as a felony, which was not a felony at common law,
was not a felony even though punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.
21 Ops. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 506 (1932). In 1935, making a slightly different
interpretation, the Attorney General ruled that a crime not expressly designated
as a felony, and for which no place of imprisonment was designated, constituted
only a misdemeanor. 24 Ops. Wis. ATrT'y GEN. 451 (1935). There were no
Wisconsin cases clearly in point. In State v. Fackler, 91 Wis. 418, 64 N.W.
1029 (1895), the court held that an offense punishable by unspecified imprisonment for a minimmin term of six months was not a felony.
In other states there were and are numerous cases holding that failure to
designate the place of confinement raises a conclusive presumption that confinement shall be in the county jail and that the offense is a misdemeanor.
"In all our penal legislation, when the word imprisonment only is used, it
is understood to mean imprisonment in a county jail or local prison, and
when the legislature has intended imprisonment in the penitentiary, it has
been so expressed." Allgood v. State, 206 Ark. 699, 177 S.W.2d 928, 929
(1944). See also People v. Hightower, 414 Ill.537, 112 N.E. 126 (1953);
Union Ice Co. v. Rose, 11 Cal. App. 348, 104 Pac. 1006 (1909). For a statement of the rule and the citation of additional cases, see 24B C.J.S. Criminal
Law §2000(b) (1962).
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may differ somewhat, 5 this is the statutory definition found in the vast
majority of states. 6 Under federal law'and in some states, a felony is
7
a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year.
Several states have laws which provide that any crime shall be deemed
a misdemeanor," from the time of sentence, if the judgment actually
imposed is other than death or imprisonment in the state prison.9
Although the issue has not been squarely decided in Wisconsin,
remarks in Pruitt v. State indicate that the maximum statutory punishment will determine the grade of the offense.'0 A crime that may be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison normally will constitute
a felony, even though the court is authorized to, and does in fact, impose a lesser sentence. The same rule apparently prevails in almost
every jurisdiction having a similar statutory definition."' In Illinois,
however, a crime is not a felony unless the offense is "absolutely pun2
ishable" by death or imprisonment in the state prison.1
If the legislature designates a crime as a "misdemeanor" or "felony,"
the Pruitt case 3 indicates that this shall be controlling rather than the
place of punishment authorized by the statute.' 4 The same rule prevails in many other jurisdictions.' 5 There is, perhaps, an equal number
In State v. Di Paglia, 247 Iowa 79, 71 N.W.2d 601 (1955), the Iowa
ten years was a misdemeanor because the statute specified neither the grade
Supreme Court held that a crime punishable by imprisonment not to exceed
of the offense nor the place of imprisonment. However, in State v. Newton,

247 Iowa 550, 74 N.W.2d 687 (1956), the 6ourt held that the general rule was
not applicable to an offense punishable by life imprisonment because the
quantum of punishment bore no natural or reasonable relation to misdemeanor
punishment.

- The New York statute provides that a felony is a crime which "is or may
be" punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison. N.Y. PENAL
LAW, §2.
CSee generally, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§5-7 (1961) ; 14 Am. Ju. 2d Criminal
Law §§19-21 (1965).

7 See 18 U.S.C. §1 (1964),

CONN. GEN. STAT. §1-1 (1958); REv. LAWS or HAWII,
§247-2 (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN., §609.02 (1964). The Delaware statute
provides that "any crime or offense not specifically designated by law to be
a felony is a misdemeanor." 11 DEL. CoDE ANN. §101(b) (1953).
8 See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §17; ORE. Rav. STAT. §161.030(2) (1966).
9 A crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison continues to be a
felony for all purposes until judgment is pronounced. State v. Johnson, 164
Cal.App. 2d 470, 330 P.2d 894 (1958). The felony statute of limitations continues to apply even though the crime becomes a misdemeanor upon imposition of a fine or county jail imprisonment. Doble v. Superior Court, 197 Cal.
556, 241 Pac. 852 (1925).
10 16 Wis.2d 169, 173, 114 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1962).

"See cases cited 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §6, n. 22-24 (1961), also, Annot., 95

A.L.R. 1115 (1935).
"Where the punishment prescribed for an offense is punishment by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or by imprisonment in the county jail, or by fine, the
offense is not a felony but is a misdemeanor." People v. Anderson, 342 Ill. 290,
174 N.E. 391, 393 (1930). Accord: Lamkin v. People, 94 Ill. 501 (1880) ; People v. Stavrakas, 335 Ill. 570, 167 N.E. 852 (1929). See Annot. 95 A.L.R. 1115,
1120-21 (1935).
13 Pruitt v. State, 16 Wis.2d 169, 174, 114 N.W.2d 148, 151 (1962).
'4 The pertinent cases are collected in 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §5, (1961).
'5 See e.g., Nation v. State, 154 Fla. 337, 17 So.2d 521, 522 (1944). ". . . the legis12
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of jurisdictions with cases holding that the nature and extent of the
prescribed punishment determine the grade of the crime irrespective
of a "felony" or "misdemeanor" label. 16
In 1945, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a statute prescribing
rules for determining the place of imprisonment when the statute defining the offense failed to so specify. Section 959.044, which was
enacted as Chapter 154 of the 1945 Session Laws, provides as follows:
When a statute authorizes imprisonment for its violation but
does not prescribe the place of imprisonment, (a) a sentence of
less than one year shall be to the county jail, (b) a sentence of
more than one year shall be to the state prison and the minimum
under the indeterminate sentence law shall be one year, and
(c) a sentence of one year may be to either the state prison or
the county jail.
The legislature described chapter 154 as an act "relating to the
place of imprisonment when none is expressed." The preamble to the
act did not recite any other purpose, and the statute is simply captioned: "Place of imprisonment when none expressed." The legislative
drafting file discloses only that the measure was sponsored by the District Attorney's Association and that it came to the legislature in the
form of a draft prepared by an Assistant Attorney General.
EFFECT OF THE "PLACE OF IMPRISONMENT"

STATUTE

It is reasonably certain that the "place of imprisonment" statute
was enacted for the sole purpose of providing rules which made the
length of the sentence controlling in determining the place of confinement. The statute applied indiscriminately to both felonies and misdemeanors, and overruled supreme court cases 7 holding that the grade
of the offense was controlling if the statute did not specify the place
of confinement. Although the 1945 legislature also changed the "felony"
definition, the change was consistent with, if not required by, the legislature's objective to render the grade of the offense immaterial. The
"place of imprisonment" statute plainly authorized the courts to commit a felon to the county jail for a term not exceeding one year, whereas the old definition implied mandatory commitment to the state prison.'
lative classification will control without regard to the punishment imposed as
...the Legislature has the power to denounce any act as a crime and to fix
the grade of the offense and prescribe the punishment therefor."
16 "Calling an offense a misdemeanor does not make it so when the punishment
imposed makes it a felony." State v. Harwood, 206 N.C. 87, 173 S.E. 24, 25
(1934).
17 Veley v. State, 194 Wis. 408, 216 N.W. 522 (1927) ; Grimes v. State, 236 Wis.
31, 293 N.W. 925 (1940). In the cited cases, the supreme court vacated one
year sentences to the state prison under a statute designating the crime as a
misdemeanor, but not specifying the place of imprisonment. The court held
that the old §353.27 was applicable to fix the place of punishment.
18 See note 4, supra. In Boehm v. State, 190 Wis. 609, 209 N.W. 730 (1926), the
court had held that designation of an offense as a "felony" implied that imprisonment should be in the state prison. This construction of the former
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In Pruitt v. State,19 the court confirmed that section 959.044 made
it possible to sentence a misdemeanant to the state prison for not less
than one year and to sentence a felon to the county jail for a term not
exceeding one year. In this case, the court held that a defendant had
been lawfully sentenced to the state prison for one year under a statute
which described the crime as a misdemeanor, but which was silent as
to the place of imprisonment. The case implicitly holds that an offense
described as a "misdemeanor" was not raised to a felony even though
it became punishable by imprisonment in the state prison upon the
enactment of the predecessor of section 959.044 in 1945. -Although not
necessary to the decision, language in the Pruitt case clearly indicated
that an offense of unspecified grade, punishable-by imprisonment for
2
a term of one year, constituted a felony by resort to section 959.044. 0
In State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, however, the court said that its
comment in the Pruitt case should be confined to offenses created by
the Criminal Code.2"
In Gaynon, the supreme court held that a violation of section
71.11(42), punishing income tax offenses by individuals, did not constitute a felony, even though the offense was punishable by imprisonment in the state prison by virtue of section 959.044. In subtance,
the court held that an unlabelled offense found outside the Code was not
upgraded from a misdemeanor to a felony by reason of the enactment
of the "place of imprisonment" statute. The court concluded that section 959.044 was not enacted for the purpose of changing the grade
of crimes. Accordingly, the court refused to use the statute "retroactively as a whiplash to change the grade of an offense by reference"
to the felony definition of section 939.60.2

Inasmuch as a clear expression of legislative intention is required
to upgrade a misdemeanor to a felony, the supreme court refused to
give section 959.044 such an effect by indirection. 23 Mindful of the
significance of the distinction between a felony and a misdemeanor,24
felony definition created a conflict with old §359.07, which provided that a sentence to state prison should be for a term not less than one year.
19 16 Wis.2d 169, 114 N.W.2d 148 (1962).
20 Id. at 173, 114 N.W.2d at 151.
2131 Wis.2d 609, 623-24, 143 N.W.2d 437, 444 (1966).
22 Id. at 618, 143 N.W.2d at 442. See also Archer v. State, 165 Md. 155, 125 A.774
(1924), where it was held that the statute of limitations was not affected by a
provision authorizing sentence to either jail or penitentiary.
23 In Brooks v. People, 14 Colo. 413, 24 Pac. 553 (1890), the court assumed that
some misdemeanors were raised to felonies by a statute directing imprisonment in the state prison for all terms exceeding six months. The court held,
however, that the statute had not been constitutionally enacted because the
title of the act disclosed no such purpose. The constitutional question could
have been avoided by holding that the statute did not have the indirect, undisclosed purpose of raising the grade of any crime.
24
"In most cases the place of imprisonment is different; the statute of limitations is twice as long for a felony as a misdemeanor; one charged
with a felony is entitled to a preliminary hearing; the stigma of a felony
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the court also gave due cognizance to the following basic rules of
statutory construction: 1) penal statutes must be construed strictly in
would create a
favor of the accused ;25 and 2) a construction which
6
new felony should be avoided whenever possible.1
INcOME TAX VIOLATIONS

In State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger,2 7 a criminal complaint had been
filed against Irwin E. Gaynon on April 5, 1965, charging that the defendant filed false income tax returns for the years 1958, 1959, and
1960. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the violation was a misdemeanor barred by the three-year statute
of limitations.2s After a complicated legal battle, the issue reached the
supreme court on appeal from an order denying the defendant's application for a writ of prohibition to prevent the county court from
proceeding in the case. The supreme court held that the offense constituted a misdemeanor, that the county court had no jurisdiction to
conduct a preliminary examination, and that an absolute writ of prohibition should be issued.
Section 71.11(42) of the Wisconsin Statutes reads as follows:
Any person, other than a corporation, who fails or refuses to
make a return at the time hereinbefore specified in each year or
shall render a false or fraudulent return shall upon conviction
be fined not to exceed $500, or be imprisoned not to exceed one
year or both, at the discretion of the court, together with the cost
of prosecution.
Except for the deletion in 1927 of the words "joint stock company or
association," the statute reads precisely the same as when it was
adopted in 1911.21 At that time, the legislature unquestionably intended
is greater; and under the repeater statute, more severe penalties are
authorized for felonies than for misdemeanors."
State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis. 2d 609, 620, 143 N.W.2d 437, 443
(1966). See also BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME §81 (1946) ; State v. Masteller, 232
Minn. 196, 45 N.W. 2d 109 (1950).
In Wisconsin, prosecution for a felony must be commenced within six years,
whereas prosecution for a misdemeanor must be commenced within three years
of commission of the offense, Wis. STAT. §939.74 (1965). The holding in the
Gaynon case that income tax violations constitute misdemeanors meant that all
counts were barred by the statute of limitations.
25 State v. Wrobel, 24 Wis.2d 270, 275, 128 N.W.2d 629, 631 (1964) ; 21 Am. JUR.
2d Criminal Law §19 (1965).
26 Wilson v. State, 1 Wis. 184 (1853) ; State v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 141
Wis. 557, 124 N.W. 502 (1910). See also, Commonwealth v. Barlow, 1 Mass.
439 (1808); Commonwealth v. Macomber, 3 Mass. 254 (1807).
In the Wilson case, the court held that a crime punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison did not become a statutory felony when Wisconsin became
a state. The statutory definition did not make a felony out of an offense which
"before the statute was a mere misdemeanor."
2731 Wis.2d 609, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966).
28 WIS.

STAT. §939.74 (1965).

29 Wis. Laws 1911, ch. 658, §1087m-12(3). Most sections of the income tax act
were renumbered by Wis. Laws 1947, ch. 318. §2 of the 1947 enactment specifically states that no substantive change was made in the law.
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to create a misdemeanor, 30 and the supreme court so held in the Gaynon
case.
Prior to the formation of an Intelligence Division in 1961, the
criminal sanctions of the Wisconsin income tax laws were rarely enforced.31 At most, there had been only a handful of prosecutions, and
it is virtually certain that there never had been a prosecution for tax
evasion in Wisconsin prior to the enactment of the "place of imprisonment" statute. It would be difficult to believe that the 1945 legislature
intended to upgrade income tax violations when criminal tax statutes
were of academic interest only.
The punishment provided by the legislature is that commonly prescribed for misdemeanors. The same punishment was-and still isapplicable both to the relatively minor offense of failure or refusal to
make a return and to the more serious offense of rendering a false or
fraudulent return. If the legislature had intended to raise income tax
offenses from misdemeanors to felonies, the punishment undoubtedly
would have been increased and made commensurate with other felonies. 3 2 Moreover, a distinction probably would have been made between the offense of filing a fraudulent return and the mere failure to
file a return.

33

TEE "PLAIN MEANING" RULE

Because section 71.11(42) authorizes confiinement not exceeding
one year and does not specify the place of imprisonment, imposition
See discussion and cases cited in note 4, supra. The Attorney General applied
the misdemeanor statute of limitations in construing income tax offenses. 25
Ops. Wis. ATi'Y. GEN. 237 (1936). Although a preliminary examination had
been held with respect to the 1948 tax violation involved in State ex rel. Marachowsky v. Kerl, 258 Wis. 309, 45 N.W.2d 668 (1951), this fact was not significant. The statutes at that time authorized a preliminary examination with
respect to any offense punishable by more than six months in prison, and the
case was prosecuted within the three year limitation period applicable to misdemeanors. §954.038, prohibiting a preliminary examination on a misdemeanor
charge, was first enacted in 1961. Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 643.
31 See Lipton and Petrie, Wisconsin Criminal Tax Fraud Problems, 48 MIARQ. L.
REv. 1, 5 (1964).
32 See e.g., Wis. Laws 1947, ch. 446, which was an act "increasing the penalty"
for producing a miscarriage. Previously, the offense was punishable by maximum fine of $500 or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year. Wis. STAT. §351.22 (1945). As amended, the offense became punishable
by maximum fine of $5,000 or by imprisonment "in the state prison not less
than one year nor more than 3 years.. . ." Wis. STAT. §351.22 (1947).
33 Under federal law, failure to file a return is a misdemeanor, whereas filing a
false return is a felony. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§7201, 7203. Income tax offenses are misdemeanors under the laws of most states, including New York.
N.Y. TAX LAWS, §376(5).
The Wisconsin statute punishing filing of fraudulent gift tax returns provides that violators shall be deemed guilty of a "misdemeanor." Wis. STAT.
§72.81(8) (1965). Sales tax violations also are punishable as misdemeanors.
Wis. STAT. §77.60(6) (1965). Because the statute specifies no penalty or place
of imprisonment, the punishment is a fine not exceeding $250 or imprisonment
in the county jail for not more than one year in accordance with the provisions
of §939.61.
30
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of the maximum sentence presumably permits imprisonment in the
state prison under section 959.044. Accordingly, the State contended
in the Gaynon case that a violation of section 71.11(42) constituted a
felony under section 939.60, which provides that "a crime punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison is a felony" and that "every other
crime is a misdemeanor."
Three justices of the supreme court agreed with the State's contention that section 71.11(42) must be construed by reference to both
sections 939.60 and 959.044, and that a "plain reading" of the statutes
required the conclusion that a violation constitutes a felony.34 The
majority of the court apparently did not find the statutes plain and unambiguous, particularly in the "twilight zone of 'not more than one
year.'" In any event, the court implicitly rejected the "plain meaning"
rule with the observation that "the judging process requires more than
a mechanical application of the statutes to facts." 35 This observation
36
is supported by weighty authority in federal case law.

Even though a superficial examination of the statutory language
reveals no uncertainty of expression, it has been held that aids to
construction may still be utilized. 37 The rule generally applied is that
3 State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis.2d 609, 624, 143 N.W.2d 437, 445
(1966). This conclusion rested on the assumption that the provision for alternative county jail or state prison imprisonment applied to a statute authorizing
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Interestingly, a New York
court found similar statutory provisions "somewhat conflicting" and held that
the provision for alternative one year sentences applied only to a crime punishable by imprisonment for one year or more, not to a crime punishable by a
term of one year or less. The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's
conclusion that the offense was only a misdemeanor. People ex rel. Devoe v.
Kelly, 32 Hun 536 (3rd Dept. 1884), aff'd, 97 N.Y. 212 (1884).
The Revised New York Penal Law, §10.00(4), effective September 1, 1967,
changes the felony definition to cover offenses punishable by imprisonment in
excess of one year. No change was made in the "place of imprisonment" statutes.
35 Id. at 623, 143 N.W.2d at 444.
36 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against the dangers
of an approach which "confines itself to the bare words of a statute .. "
Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962). In Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357
U.S. 93, 100 (1958), the Court said that ascertainment of the legislative intention is "nothing like a mechanical endeavor." Justice Frankfurter continued,
"[I]nevitably there enters into the construction of statutes the play of judicial
judgment within the limits of the relevant legislative materials."
For additional cases rejecting the "mechanical application" of statutes, see
United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957); Lawson v. Suwannee
Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949) ; Eck v. United Arab Airlines,
Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 4
(2d Cir. 1966).
37 No matter how clear the words of a statute may be, there is "no rule of law
forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history. . .

."

Harrison v. Northern

Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) ; accord, United States v. Dickerson, 310
U.S. 554, 562 (1940).
In United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 260 (1959), the Court observed
that statutes are "not inert exercises in literary composition" and held that the
"general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may lay down."
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"an ambiguity calling for construction may arise when the consequence of a literal interpretation of the language is an unjust, absurd,
unreasonable, or mischievous result, or one at variance with the policy
38
of the legislation as a whole."
In determining whether a crime is a felony or misdemeanor, a literal
interpretation of sections 939.60 and 959.044 could lead to unreasonable
results. With respect to crimes punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of one year or more, it would be unreasonable, if not absurd,
to hold that patent misdemeanors not described as such were raised to
felonies, but that similar offenses labeled "misdemeanor" were not
upgraded.3 9 The purely fortuitous circumstance of a draftsman having
chosen to omit the label, and having failed to designate county jail as
the place of imprisonment, should not justify the conclusion that some
patent misdemeanors were raised to felonies by the "place of imprisonment" statute.

40

Section 959.044 applies with equal force to both misdemeanors and
felonies and makes the length of the sentence the controlling factor in
determining the place of imprisonment. An interpretation that section
959.044 raised the grade of some misdemeanors would not be consistent
with the legislative purpose of rendering the grade of the crime immaterial in determining the place of imprisonment. It is not essential
38 82 C.J.S. Statutes §322b(3) (1953). For Wisconsin cases rejecting blind appli-

cation of the "plain meaning" rule, see Isaksen v. Chesapeake Instrument

Corp., 19 Wis.2d 282, 289-90, 120 N.W2d 151, 155-56 (1963); Connell v. Luck,
264 Wis. 282, 284-85, 58 N.W.2d 633, 634 (1953); Pfingsten v. Pfingsten, 164
Wis. 308, 313, 159 N.W. 921, 923 (1916); State ex rel. Husting v. Board of
State Canvassers, 159 Wis. 216, 227, 150 N.W. 542, 546 (1914).

In State ex rel. Husting v. Board of State Canvassers, 159 Wis. 216, 227,
150 N.W. 542, 546 (1914), the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the "plain
meaning" rule had received "elucidation which is a vital feature" of the rule,
and observed that the "literal sense" of words is not controlling in determining
"whether words are plain or not."
The admonition of the Husting case may not have received adequate recognition in the following recent cases: Miller v. Wadkins, 31 Wis.2d 281, 284-85
n. 7, 142 N.W.2d 855, 856 (1966) ; Alexander v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins.
Co., 25 Wis.2d 623, 626, 131 N.W.2d 373, 375 (1964) ; Estate of Ries, 259 Wis.
453, 459, 49 N.W.2d 483, 486 (1951). Nevertheless, the opinions in these cases
generally conceded that the same result would have been reached if the suggested aids to construction had been employed.
39 "An intent to discriminate unjustly between different cases of the same kind is
not to be ascribed to the legislature. It is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to make a distinction which would convict it of an unaccountable
capriciousness on the subject." 50 Am. Juit Statutes §372 (1944).
Constitutional doubts would be raised by a construction that §959.044 raised
the grade of some offenses. Although the legislature has great latitude in
classifying crimes and fixing punishment, classifications "must be natural, not
arbitrary, and must be made with reference to the heinousness or gravity of
the act, and not matters disconnected therefrom." 24B C.J.S. Criminal Lw
§1975 (1962).
40 It would have been incongruous to hold that income tax violations were
raised to felonies, whereas gift tax offenses, punishable by fine of $5,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding one year under §72.81 (8), remained misdemeanors.
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to the accomplishment of that purpose to construe the statute as chang41
ing the grade of any offense.

CRIMINAL

CODE OFFENSES

The Criminal Code was enacted in 1955 after a meticulous survey
and analysis of the chapters on crimes and criminal procedure. Many
sections were completely rewritten or newly created in the Criminal
Code. Moreover, every section of the Code was drafted in the light
of section 959.044, which had been in existence since 1945.
Prior to the enactment of the Code, the criminal statutes almost
invariably specified the place of imprisonment, and frequently designated the grade of the crime. Although the Code defines "felony" as
a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, there is not
a single section in the Criminal Code that specifically designates "state
prison" as the place of imprisonment. In fact, the place of confinement
was eliminated from all Code provisions except certain offenses punishable by a maximum term of one year. The description of offenses as
"misdemeanor" or "felony" was discontinued in the Code. There is
only one instance in the Code where the grade of the crime is specified. 42 This radically different drafting approach makes it essential to
refer to section 959.044 in determining the grade of almost all Criminal Code offenses, as well as the place of imprisonment.
Many Code offenses punishable by a term not exceeding one year
specify county jail as the place of confinement, thereby preserving the
misdemeanor classification of the original enactment. 43 Some relatively
important "one-year" offenses not specifying the place of imprisonment
are found in sections that were newly created or radically revised in
the Code. 44 The legislative history of these provisions clearly shows
that some of the rewritten offenses were misdemeanors when the Code
was adopted. 45 Although it seems doubtful that the legislature actually
statute should be limited to its general purpose in the absence of a specific
expression of intent to extend its operation to other matters. Abramson v.
Hard, 229 Ala. 2, 155 So. 590, 594 (1934). Statutes will not be presumed "to
make any changes in prior existing law beyond that which is necessary to carry
out the purposes of the new legislation." Heaney v. Borough of Mauch Chunk,
322 Pa. 487, 185 A. 732, 733 (1936). Accord. Will of Johnson, 175 Wis. 1, 9,
183 N.W. 888, 891 (1921).
42 Wis. STAT. §943.24(1) (1965). This is the "worthless check" offense involved
in Pruitt v. State, 16 Wis. 2d 169, 114 N.W.2d 148 (1962).
4aSee, e.g., Wis. STATS. §§940.08, 940.29, 941.13, 941.22(1), 941.23, 941.24(1),
942.02(1), 943.11, 944.20, 944.22, 946.41, 946.46, 946.69, and 947.15(1) (1965).
44 See Wis. STAT. §§942.01(1), 943.21, 943.31, 945.03, 945.05, 946.12, 946.13, 946.14,
946.47, and 946.61 (1965).
45 WVis. STAT. §942.01 (1965), punishing "defamation," combines criminal slander
41 A

and libel. Previously, "libel" was punishable by fine not exceeding $250 or im-

prisonment in the "county jail" for not more than one year. Wis. STAT. §348.41
(1) (1953). Criminal slander was described in the following subsection as a
"misdemeanor," punishable in the same manner as libel. However, §348.411
punished "slandering commercial or financial standing" by fine not exceeding
$1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, without specifying the place of
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intended to upgrade the offenses to felonies, the Gaynon case indicates
that the Supreme Court nevertheless will utilize the "place of imprisonment" statute for the purpose of determining the grade of all Code offenses.
In some of the sections which punish offenses by a term not exceeding one year, it seems likely that "county jail" was omitted inadvertently
in the Code version. 46 There is at least one instance where the place of
imprisonment must have been omitted through oversight. Section
940.08 punishes anyone who causes "death" to another by a high degree
of negligence in the operation or handling of a vehicle or weapon. Section 940.24 punishes anyone who causes "bodily harm" to another by
a high degree of negligence in the operation or handling of a weapon.
Both sections impose a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment
not exceeding one year. The statute punishing the offense involving
"bodily harm" fails to specify the place of imprisonment, whereas the
"death" section does designate "county jail" as the place of imprisonment.
imprisonment. The Code section incorporating these offenses utilizes the penalty clause of old §348.411. Curiously, conspiracy to injure another in his reputation or business is still a misdemeanor under Wis. STAT. §134.01 (1965),
which specifies "county jail."
Wis. STAT. §943.21 (1965) punishes "fraud on hotel or restaurant keeper"
by imprisonment not more than one year. This is a greatly simplified version
of the predecessor statute. Wis. STAT. §343.402(1) (a) (1953), pertaining to
fraud on innkeepers, had designated the offense as a "felony" and prescribed
unspecified imprisonment not exceeding one year. Fraud at a restuarant, however, had been punishable by fine not exceeding $250 or imprisonment in
the "county jail" not exceeding one year. Wis. STAT. §343.402(3) (1953).
Wis. STAT. §943.31 (1965) creates "a new crime," covering extortion "by
threats to defame, whether the information is true or false." Platz, The Crininal Code 1956 Wis. L. REv. 350, 375-76. The offense was subjected to the same
punishment as "defamation."
Wis. STAT. §944.30 (1965) punishes "prostitution" by unspecified imprisonment not exceeding one year. Previously, prostitution was a "misdemeanor,"
punishable by fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment in the "county jail" for
not more than one year. Wis. STAT. §351.19 (1953). Recently, the District Attorney for Milwaukee County purportedly described prostitution as a "serious
misdemeanor." (Milwaukee Journal, April 4, 1966, Part 1, p. 23, col. 3).
Wis. STAT. §945.03 (1965) punishes "commercial gambling" by a fine not
more than $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year. The same penalty
applies to "dealing in gambling devices" under §945.05. Previously, most gam.
bling statutes provided increased penalties for second and subsequent offenseq
with felony punishment applicable only to the third offense. Wis. STAT. §§348.01,
348.07(1), 348.08, 348.09, 348.173 (1953).
Wis. STAT. §§946.12, 946.13 and 946.14 (1965) punishing misconduct in public office, consolidate and revise 13 predecessor sections. Most of the offenses

had been misdemeanors..

Wis. STAT. §946A7 (1965), harboring or aiding felons, is a radical revision
of the "accessory after the fact" statute, formerly Wis. STAT. §353.08 (1953).
Wis. STAT. §946.61 (1965) is a new offense which punishes bribery of witnesses
not to testify.
46 See Wis. STAT. §§946.63 and 946.71 (1965). §946.63 punishes concealing the
death of a child, which had been a misdemeanor under Wis. STAT. §351.24
(1953). Wis. STAT. §946.71 (1965) dealing with interference with custody of
child, incorporates offenses formerly punishable as misdemeanors under WIs.
STAT. §§340. 54(2) and 351.29 (1953).
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EFFECT OF CRIMINAL CODE BILL

In the Gaynon case the state contended unsuccessfully upon motion
for rehearing that income tax violations were upgraded to felonies upon
enactment of the Criminal Code. If income tax offenses were not upgraded from misdemeanors upon enactment of the "place of imprisonment" statute, no change in grade was effected by the Code. The Code
made no change whatsoever in the pertinent statutes, 4 and nothing in
the Code directly or indirectly manifested an intention to raise the
grade of any offense outside the Code.
Section 939.20 provides in substance that the general provisions of
chapter 939 should apply to offenses defined in other chapters of the
statutes. There is no reason to believe, however, that any change in the
law was intended by enactment of section 939.20. This provision merely
made it clear that the felony definition, statute of limitations, and other
general provisions of chapter 939 should continue to apply outside the
Code. The chief purpose of section 939.20, it would seem, was to guard
against the application of new Code definitions to crimes created b
legislatures which did not have those definitions in mind.
A 1951 report of the Legislative Council4 s contained a comment to
the effect that a prescribed maximum imprisonment of one year or more
generally means that a crime is a felony. Although the report recommended continuation of the existing statutory definition, it noted that
the meaning of the statute "would be clarified considerably by defining
felony and misdemeanor in terms of prescribed maximum penalties."
No change was recommended even though the statutes were not considered to be "plain and unambiguous." 49 It was concluded that a new
definition would require an examination of every crime in the statute
book, and that such an undertaking was "not feasible.
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47 The present WIs. STAT. §959.044 (1965) was merely renumbered and placed
in the non-Code chapter on "Judgment and Execution." Wis. Laws, 1955, ch.
696, §311. The felony definition was repealed and recreated, but the wording
was not changed. Hence, the old provision continued "in force without interruption." Fullerton v. Spring, 3 Wis. 667, 671-72 (1854); accord: Wisconsin
Trust Co. v. Munday, 168 Wis. 31, 45, 168 N.W. 393, 398 (1918) ; Guse v. A. 0.
Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 406, 51 N.W.2d 24, 26 (1952). See, also Wis. STAT.
§990.001(7), (1963) and 82 C.J.S. Statutes §276 (1953), covering codifications.
48 See report accompanying 1951 Bill No. 784, S. (Wis. Legis. Council, 1950
Report, Vol. VII).
49 No specific recognition of ambiguity is manifested in reports pertaining to the
1953 and 1955 Criminal Code Bills. However, at a meeting held July 22, 1955,
the advisory committee concluded that the "question of redefining felony and
misdemeanor" was not a "proper matter" for the committee.

5OA proposal to adopt the California and Oregon rule (see note 8, supra) was
rejected "on the ground that it was too great a policy change for this bill. ... "
Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 350, 368. A subcommittee report
opposing the suggested change emphasized its possible dislocating effect in various areas of statutory law. In a persuasive, unpublished report favoring the
change, Mr. Platz stated: "To lay down by statute an inflexible distinction
between misdemeanors and felonies leads to many absurdities which can best
be alleviated in practice by letting the sentence actually imposed determine the
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A comment accompanying the 1953 Criminal Code bill 51 opens
with the statement that the felony definition applies to all crimes, not
only to those in the Criminal Code. Whether or not a crime is punishable in the state prison, the comment then states, depends in general
on the maximum penalty prescribed for the crime. After referring to
the "place of imprisonment" statute, the comment concludes: "The result is that a crime having a prescribed maximum penalty of imprisonment for one year or more is a felony, since such a crime is punishable
by imprisonment in state prison. . .

."

A separate paragraph indicates

that the statutory definition is inapplicable where a crime is specifically
denominated "felony" or "misdemeanor."
At most, the foregoing comment has its significance only in interpreting crimes defined in the Criminal Code. The statement that the
maximum penalty generally determines whether or not a crime is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison obviously applies only to Code
offenses, which were rewritten to eliminate the place of imprisonment.
Outside the Code, most criminal statutes specify the place of imprisonment, thus precluding application of section 959.044. It is apparent
that the comment cannot be applied in the interpretation of unchanged
provisions outside the Code which were created prior to the enactment
of the "place of imprisonment" statute.
Because the 1953 legislature specifically rejected and deleted all
comments,5 2 they are of doubtful materiality in interpreting the Criminal Code. In any event, the comments do not provide a substitute for
the legislative action required to raise the grade of an offense. Moreover, there is language in some comments which evidences a clear intention not to effect substantive changes in non-Code offenses created in
reliance upon previous laws.53 This stated concern with the intention of
prior legislatures would be mere mockery if the Code could be interpreted as raising the grade of misdemeanors found outside the Code.
Cursory examination of the Criminal Code bill may give the impression that the legislature attempted a wholesale revision of the
criminal statutes both within and without the Code. Actually, the
drafters of the Code made no attempt to examine all of the countless
grade of the crime." Reply to Subcommittee Report on Definition of Felony
and Misdemeanor, p. 4.
51 See Bill No. 100, A, p. 48.
52 Amendment No. 3, A, to Bill No. 100, A. The advisory committee concluded
that there should be no comments in the 1955 bill. Platz, The Criminal Code,
1956 Wis. L. REv. 350, 353.
53In a comment accompanying proposed §339.20 it was said that "definitions cannot apply to sections outside the criminal code . . . not drafted with those
definitions in mind." 1953 Criminal Code, Bill No. 100, A, p. 11.
A comment accompanying the proposed §339.61 includes the folowing statement: "Since prior legislatures may have passed statutes in reliance on the
penalty provided by this section, the penalty is retained unchanged in the new
section." 1953 Criminal Code, Bill No. 100, A, p. 49.
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criminal provisions scattered throughout the stautes. A prominent member of the advisory committee has conceded that the revision of the
criminal statutes outside the Code was far beyond the scope of the
project."
The Criminal Code bill transferred approximately 180 sections from
Title XXXII, "Crimes and the Punishment Thereof," to regulatory
chapters of the statutes.5" Although the mechanics of accomplishing
this task may give the illusion that extensive consideration was given
to crimes outside the Code, substantive changes were not attempted
even in the numerous statutes transferred to regulatory chapters.56 In
contrast to the provisions retained in the Criminal Code, 172 sections
were transferred verbatim out of chapters 340 to 352, inclusive, without
employing the Code technique of deleting "misdemeanor," "felony,"
"county jail" or "state prison." There is no indication that the legislature considered the substance of any non-Code offenses other than those
dealing with theft and related crimes. The latter offenses were amended
to conform to the important new Code technique of combining various
related crimes "into a single offense labeled 'theft.' ,57
UNCHANGED NON-CODE OFFENSES

In the Gaynon case, the Court noted that the construction applicable to Code offenses did not apply to offenses outside the Code which
had been created under different rules of draftsmanship. Although
failure to specify the place of imprisonment in a Code statute imposing
imprisonment for one year or more probably means that the offense
constitutes a felony, failure to specify the place of imprisonment outside the Code normally means that county jail was intended and that
the offense constitutes a misdemeanor. The latter interpretation, at the
very least, must be accorded to statutes enacted prior to the place of
imprisonment statute, which have been unchanged since that time.
As mentioned above, numerous criminal offenses were transferred
verbatim to regulatory chapters of the statutes when the Criminal Code
was enacted. The legislature made no attempt to amend these statutes
by the technique employed in drafting Criminal Code offenses. Inas54 "It requires no argument to demonstrate that such laws, however much they
may stand in need of revision, are not a proper subject for a project like the
one here under consideration. Not only would it require an unconscionable
amount of time; it would require intimate knowledge of the details of more
fields of human activity than could be comprehended by any group of people. . . ." Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 350, 357.

55 See Wis. Laws 1955, ch. 696, §§62-307 inclusive.

56 Changes of an elementary, technical nature were made in a few instances.
For example, when §346.29 was transferred to §13.70(3), it -was necessary to

delete the obsolete reference to "section 346.27." Wis. Laws 1955, ch. 696, §174.
For similar reasons, the Code bill made a few changes in provisions not previously found in Title XXXII.
57 Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 350, 374. See Wis. Laws 1955, ch.

696, §§49-59, inclusive.
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much as these statutes were merely renumbered by the Criminal Code
bill, they should be construed the same as they would have been prior
to the transfers effected by the Code.58
Only one instance has been noted where a transferred statute failed
to specify the place of imprisonment. The old provision punishing
"commercial bribery" was transferred verbatim and became section
134.05. 59 Under well-established rules of construction, the offense originally was a misdemeanor. The offense still constitutes a misdemeanor
under the rationale of the Gaynon case.
The Gaynon case undoubtedly will be controlling in determining
the grade of all untouched non-Code offenses containing a penalty
provision substantially identical to the income tax statute. Chief among
these are the provisions punishing unlawful practice of medicine and
dentistry.60 Another identical penalty clause is found in section 49.35.
This section provides a "general penalty" for violations of sections
49.21 to 49.38 for which no penalty is otherwise provided. Obviously, the
legislature had no intention of raising the punishment from misdemeanor to felony for the relatively insignificant violations covered by
the catch-all provisions of section 49.35.
NEWLY CREATED AND AMENDED STATUTES

There is no specific indication in the Gaynon case of the construction that will be given to offenses created after the enactment of the
place of imprisonment statute in 1945.61 The opinion does imply, though,
58 See cases cited note 47, supra.
59 Wis. STAT. §348.486 (1953), was renumbered §134.05 by Wis. Laws 1955, ch.
696, §280. The penalty is a fine not exceeding $500, or imprisonment not exceeding one year.
60 WIS. STAT. §147.21 (1965)
(medicine) ; Wis. STAT. §152.09 (1965) (dentistry).
The statute punishing unlawful practice of law prescribes a maximum fine of
$500 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, but the offense is designated a
"misdemeanor" and county jail is prescribed as the place of confinement. Wis.
STAT. §256.30 (1965). The penalty clause of the statute punishing unlawful
practice of accountancy is the same. Wis. STAT. §135.11 (1965).
In State ex rel. Fieldhack v. Gregorski, 272 Wis. 570, 76 N.W.2d 382 (1956),
the State's brief flatly characterized unlawful practice of medicine as a "misdemeanor." (Respondent's Brief, p. 4.) The respondent's return to the petition
for a writ of prohibition alleged that the crime was a: misdemeanor and Circuit
Judge Drechsler agreed. (Appendix to Fieldhack's Brief, pp. 103, 120-21.) The
Supreme Court did not decide whether the offense constituted a misdemeanor
or a felony.
61 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §77.64(4) (1965), punishing taxpayers who file false reports of livestock or stock in trade. Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 620, §50. The maximum penalty for any official aiding or abetting filing any such report is imprisonment for six months. In the same chapter, an older statute punishes making
of false forest crop reports to the conservation commission as a "misdemeanor"
and prescribes imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year.
Wis. STAT. §77.09 (1965).
Criminal statutes in Title XLIV, the "Vehicle Code" created by Wis. Laws
1957, ch. 260, seems to follow the technique employed in the Criminal Code.
Most sections imposing imprisonment not exceeding one year specify "county

jail." See §§343.16 (5), 346.30(3). 346.43 (3), 346.60 (3).

Two provisions in the Vehicle Code imposing such punishment do not spec-
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that section 959.044 should not be applied mechanically to any offense
that is outside the Code.
It is clear that the court will not attach any significance to amendments deleting "misdemeanor" and "county jail" from non-Code
sections punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year. Such
deletions frequently were made merely for the purpose of removing
supposedly obsolete terminology, pursuant to instructions set forth in
62
drafting manuals prepared by the Legislative Reference Bureau.
The earliest manual available in the Legislative Reference Library
was published in 1941. An appendix added in 1943 stated that the
penalty clause previously recommended was cumbersome and contained
unnecessary language. A simplified penalty clause, omitting "misdemeanor" and "county jail," was suggested. The same simplified penalty
clause was recommended in the manual published after enactment of
the "place of imprisonment" statute and has been recommended in all
manuals issued since enactment of the Code in 1955.63
The 1958 manual contains an historical note to the effect that the
1951 legislature began shortening penalty clauses with the approval of
the revisor of statutes. 64 The manuals, giving examples taken from
revisor's correction bills, instruct the draftsmen to make similar
changes when amending statutes containing such "obsolete" terminology. The examples show the deletion of terminology which would be
essential to the continuation of misdemeanor punishment under the
65
interpretation advanced by the State in the Gaynon case.
Legislation passed less than four months after the "place of imprisonment" statute indicated that the statute should not be utilized to
determine the grade of any crime. Chapter 585 of the Laws of 1945
completely revised the relief statutes and greatly simplified sections
ify the place of imprisonment. Wis. STAT. §344.48 (1965), is a new provision
punishing "forged proof" of financial responsibility. Wis. STAT. §346.74(5)
(1965) is a partial revision of the "hit and run" statute, formerly §85.141, created by Wis. Laws 1935, ch. 427. Originally, the statute created a felony. Wis.
STAT. §343.181 (1933). After it was amended in 1935 to eliminate the "felony"
label and "state prison," the Attorney General ruled that the offense was a
misdemeanor. See 25 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y. GEN. 456 (1936). In 1950, however, the
Attorney General ruled that a violation of §85.141 constituted a felony. 39 Ovs.
Wis. Arr'y. GEN. 321 (1950). The cryptic ruling makes no mention of the
legislative history or the prior ruling.
62 Excerpts from manuals published in 1941, 1950, 1954, 1958 and 1964 were submitted to the court in the Gaynon case at the time of oral argument. The
manuals were "uncovered" upon inquiry at the Legislative Drafting Office.
63 See "Drafting Room Instructions and Suggestions," Revised 1941, p. 20, containing the old penalty clause, and Appendix E, January, 1943, setting forth
the simplified clause.
64 See "Rules for Draftsmen," Revised-1958, p. 36, setting forth the historical
note under the simplified penalty clause.
65 The opinion in the Gaynon case details these examples. State ex tel. Gaynon v.
Krueger, 31 Wis.2d 609, 622-23, 143 N.W.2d 437, 443-44 (1966). Particular note
should be taken of the "revisor's correction" deleting "imprisonment in the
county jail" and substituting "imprisoned not more than one year." "Rules for
Draftsmen," D-64-2 (Revised October, 1964).
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49.34 and 49.53. In the process of amending these sections, the legislature deleted "misdemeanor" and "county jail" from penalty clauses
imposing imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Inasmuch
as the punishment remained the same, there is no reason to believe that
the legislature intended to raise the grade of offenses punishable under
sections 49.34 and 49.53.
One of the chief objectives in revising the relief statutes was the
elimination of "obsolete provisions" in order to effect a saving in the
biennial cost of printing the statutes.66 There is concrete evidence in
the legislative drafting file that no substantive change was intended
with respect to the cited sections. An "explanatory note" in the drafting
file contains the following comment: "Old 49.34 with only formal
changes." The comment accompanying revised section 49.53 merely
states: "Old 49.53."67
A 1947 enactment provides another instance of an amendment that
might be misinterpreted as raising a misdemeanor to a felony. Section
29.134(11), imposing imprisonment not exceeding one year, previously
had specified "county jail" for any violation of the many subsections
regulating fur dealers.68 In 1947, the legislature added a new subsection
requiring a record to be kept of raw furs bought and sold. 69 At the
same time, the legislature added an exception to the general penalty
provision, whereby violations of the record-keeping provision were made
punishable by a lesser fine and maximum imprisonment of six months.70
The legislative drafting file discloses that the amendment submitted
by the proponent of the bill specified imprisonment in the "county jail."
A legislative draftsman, however, made pencilled corrections to the
draft deleting "county jail" from the old language and from the new
provision providing the lesser penalty.
BEVERAGE, TOBACCO AND OLEOMARGARINE TAXES

The statutes punishing violations of the beverage, tobacco and oleomargarine taxes have undergone considerable revision since 1945. A
mechanical application of sections 939.60 and 959.044 might indicate
that some of the offenses discussed below constitute felonies. The legislative history of these provisions, however, dearly demonstrates that
the offenses still are misdemeanors.
The legislative drafting file contains a document, initialed "ALC.45," providing
an index to the bill, various objectives, and numerous "Explanatory Notes."
67 Id. The Supreme Court has held that similar material in the legislative
drafting files provides competent evidence of the legislature's intent. State
ex rel. Reynolds v. Circuit Court, 15 Wis.2d 311, 316, 112 N.W.2d 686,
688 (1961) ; Estate of Stone, 10 Wis.2d 467, 475, 103 N.W.2d 663, 667 (1960) ;
State ex tel. Boroo v. Town Board, 10 Wis2d 153, 159-60, 102 N.W2d 238,
241-42 (1960).
68WIs. STAT. §29.134(11) (1945).
69 Wis. Laws 1947, ch. 127, §2, creating §29.134(6m).
70 Wis. Laws 1947, ch. 127, §1, amending §29.134(11).
66
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Section 139.25(2) punishes filing of fraudulent beverage tax returns
by a fine of "not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000" or imprisonment "for not less than 90 days nor more than one year, or both."
The identical provision was found in section 139.03(16) of the 1961
statutes. The latter section, however, contained a further sentence,
punishing failure to keep records, which provided that the offender
"shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction be subject to punishment in a like manner." Reading section 139.03(16) in
its entirety, it is apparent that the "misdemeanor" label of the second
sentence applied to offenses punishable under both sentences. It would
have been incongruous to construe offenses punishable under the first
sentence as felonies and to construe offenses punishable "in like manner" as misdemeanors.
Pursuant to a revisor's bill in 1963,7 1 the first sentence of section
139.03(16) was reenacted verbatim as section 139.25(2). The second
sentence was repealed, and failure to keep records was made punishable
by fine only under section 139.25(4).72 Without the second sentence,
the State may contend that the statute calls for felony punishment. It
is apparent, however, that the revisor did not raise the grade of the
offense and that the statute must be construed as continuing the misdemeanor punishment originally intended by the legislature.
Section 139.50(25) of the 1963 statutes, which punished tobacco
tax offenses, was in all important respects substantially similar to
section 139.03(16) of the 1961 statutes. In the 1959 version, both sentences specified "misdemeanor" and "county jail. ' 73 The 1961 legislature
deleted the provision punishing failure to file a timely return and struck
out "misdemeanor" and "county jail" from the first sentence.7 4 The
sole purpose of the change was to provide "a $10.00 late filing fee in
place of the misdemeanor charge.

75

In 1965, the first sentence of section 139.50(25), punishing fraudulent returns, was repealed and recreated in substantically the same form
as section 139.44(2).7 The legislature repealed the second sentence of
71 Wis. Laws 1963, ch. 141, §6.
72 The second sentence of the 1961 version was repealed because failure to keep
records was punished by a fine only under §139.295 of the 1961 statutes. The
lighter penalty of the latter section was utilized in newly enacted §139.25(4).
The Revisor's Note following §139.25 refers to the conflict between the "last
sentence" of §139.03(16) and §139.295(2). The context, however, discloses that
the revisor meant the "second" or "second last sentence." The last sentence of
old §139.03(16) added by Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 352, §1, was incorporated verbatim as §139.25(3).
73 WIS. STAT. §139.50 (25) (1959).
74 Wis. Laws 1961, ch. 352, §5.
7 An "Explanatory Note" in the legislative drafting file states that "the present
statutes treat the failure to file a beer or cigarette tax as a misdemeanor," and
that the amendment "conforms penalties and late filing fees to similar provisions that have existed for many years in the corporate income tax field."
76 Wis. Laws 1965, ch. 67, §§4-5.
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the old section, which punished failure to keep records by fine or imprisonment not exceeding one year. Instead, that offense was made
punishable by a lighter fine and imprisonment not exceeding six months
under section 139.44(3). It is apparent that the sole purpose of the
change was to provide a lesser penalty for failure to keep records, and
that there was no intention of creating felony punishment for the offense
of filing a fraudulent return.
Section 139.60(20) provides that violations of the oleomargarine
regulations shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not more than three months. The statute also provides that any
subsequent offense shall be punished by a fine or imprisonment for "not
less than 6 months nor more than one year."
The felony definition of section 939.60 applies to any "crime" punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, not to "any offense" so
punishable. Thus, the statute does not make felons out of repeaters,
which was an incongruous possibility under an earlier felony definition.
In any event, the statute originally provided for "imprisonment in the
county jail" for the same term. 7 The place of imprisonment was deleted
in the 1959 amendment, which transferred administration of the tax
78
from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of Taxation.
FAMILY CODE OFFENSES

The laws relating to marriage and divorce were completely revised
in 1959 and incorporated in Title XXIII of the statutes as "The Family
Code." All penalty provisions pertaining to the marriage laws are now
combined in section 245.30. The penalty clause of subsections (1) and
(2) reads as follows: ".

.

. shall be fined not less than $200 nor more

than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Inasmuch
as the statute does not specify the grade of any offense, superficially it
is not clear whether the offenses punished by sections 245.30(1) and
(2) are misdemeanors or felonies.
Section 245.30 incorporates penalty provisions which had been found
in various sections. Most of the predecessor statutes specified that the
offender should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and provided for
imprisonment in the "county jail" for not more than one year. 79 The
only change in punishment effected by the revision was the increase in
the maximum fine to $1,000, which had been the maximum fine for
false solemnization of marriage.8 0
A Legislative Council note states that the penalties in section 245.30
"have all been taken from present law but the upper limit of monetary
penalties has been doubled in most cases.""' Having taken pains to note
77WIS. STAT.

§97.72(2) (1957).

7 Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 459.

78 See Wis. STAT. §§245.18, 245.19, 245.26, 245.27, 245.28 (1957).
oWis. STAT. §245.28 (1957).
81 Wis. ANNOT., 1960, p. 1123.
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that the monetary penalty had been doubled, mention unquestionably
would have been made of any change in the grade of an offense. The
inference is inescapable, therefore, that there was no intention to upgrade any existing offense.
CONCLUSION

The decision of the supreme court in the Gaynon case demonstrates
the danger involved in the mechanical application of statutes without
regard to legislative history. It is now apparent that the legislative history may be crucial in determining the grade of offenses found outside
the Criminal Code.
Although no great difficulty should be encountered in determining
the grade of criminal offenses in the light of the principles set forth in
the Gaynon case, a change in the felony definition nevertheless seems
advisable. Most, if not all, of the existing ambiguity and disparity
could be removed by defining a felony as a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term exceeding one year. Preferably,
however, the law should be amended to impose the felony stigma. only
on offenders who actually are sentenced to the state prison.

